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Outside the tax area, the law of standing reflects the general prop-
osition that a citizen not directly subject to regulation may under
some circumstances go to court to challenge government action or
inaction. Although a lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions makes it impossible to say exactly when standing exists, the
unregulated citizen clearly has some opportunities to sue to obtain
the benefits of government intervention in someone else's affairs.'
* Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
I am indebted to Edwin S. Cohen, Frank H. Easterbrook, Edmund W. Kitch, Saul X.
Levmore, Peter W. Low, Mildred W. Ravenell, Glen 0. Robinson, and Julie A. Roin for
comments and criticisms. Responsibility for errors remains my own.
1. The leading administrative law cases include Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (homeowners in vicinity of nuclear power
plant construction site granted standing to challenge constitutionality of Price-Anderson
Act limiting liability of nuclear plant operators); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973) (student organization granted standing to challenge ICC compliance with NEPA
in regulating railroad freight rate surcharges); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)
(non-participating tenant farmers granted standing to challenge amendment of cotton
crop financing program); and Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970) (data processing service granted standing to challenge ruling regu-
lating bank provision of data processing services to bank customers). To illustrate the
unpredictability of results and the instability of doctrine, compare, Heckler v. Mathews,
104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984) (though challenge to pension offset exception did not claim par-
ticular benefits, claim of unequal treatment which asserted an injury traceable to illegal
conduct and redressable by court action was sufficient to allow standing), and Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) ("... the sole requirement for
standing to sue under § 812 [Fair Housing Act] is the Art. III minima of injury in fact"),
and Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.S. 151 (1981) (California
claim that "distinct and palpable injury" to its finances was "fairly traceable" to the
Secretary of Interiors's failure to select an adequate system of bidding for offshore
leases was sufficient to allow standing to challenge the existing bidding system), and
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (allegation that peti-
tioner's conduct was destroying the integrated nature of respondent's neighborhood
asserted a "distinct and palpable injury" sufficient under Article III to allow respondent
standing), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (though husband's equal protection at-
tack on Alabama alimony laws would not free him from the appealed State judgment, his
personal stake in the result guaranteed the "concrete adverseness" necessary to support
standing), with Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984) (express
Congressional intent to bar consumer challenges to milk market orders precluded con-
sumer standing), and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (past exposure to
illegal conduct did not establish the future threat of "real and immediate" injury neces-
sary for standing to obtain injunctive relief prohibiting police use of chokeholds), and
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (organization dedicated to separation of church and state did
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By contrast, when a dispute involves the federal income tax, stand-
ing doctrine has served to bar most third-party suits. Generally a
citizen can neither challenge a tax levied on someone else, even if
the citizen would end up bearing some of its burden, nor sue to
compel the government to collect more tax, even if nontaxation in-
jures him by benefiting his competitors. The contrast with other
areas of public law is striking and invites inquiry. What is it about
federal income tax disputes that justifies such different rules gov-
erning their judicial review?
Commentators have heaped more scorn than praise on the
Supreme Court's restrictive income tax standing decisions. 2 Much
of the criticism rests on unexamined premises about the large bene-
fits and low costs ofjudicial review of tax disputes. This article will
argue that increasing the opportunities for nontaxpayers to litigate a
controversy over the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code
entails greater costs than these scholars have considered, and that
fewer benefits may flow from these suits than proponents of relaxed
standing rules have claimed. I conclude that the balance between
these considerable costs and uncertain benefits justifies the courts'
hostility to nontaxpayer litigation of income tax disputes.
not suffer injury in fact necessary for standing to challenge HEW conveyance of surplus
property to church related college), and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (organization's claim that hospitals unfairly denied serv-
ices to poor patients did not assert an injury to the organization redressable by court
action; organization, therefore, denied standing), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) (petitioners' failure to assert tangible harm from exclusionary zoning practices
was sufficient to deny standing), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (alleged nonobservance of incompatability clause by Reserve
Members of Congress produced only an abstract injury insufficient to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement for standing).
2. See, e.g., Asimow, Standing to Challenge Lenient Tax Rules: A Statutory Solution, 57
TAXES 483 (1979); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 69 (1977); Heller, Public
Interest Law and Federal Income Taxes, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAw: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 446, 459-61 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978); Lynch, Nontaxpayer Suits: Seeking
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against IRS Administrative Action, 12 AKRON L. REV. 1
(1978); Moss, Standing in Tax Litigation in the Absence of Congressional Action, 7 TAx NOTES
611 (1978); Tannenbaum, Public Interest Tax Litigation Challenging Substantive IRS Decisions,
27 NAT'L TAxJ. 373 (1974); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Report of the Special Comm. on Standing to Sue, 25 TAX LAW.
631 (1972); Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private
Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979); Note, Standing To Challenge Tax Treatment of Competi-
tors, 19 WM. & M. L. REV. 808 (1978). The criticism is not unanimous. See Bittker &
Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE
L.J. 51, 54 (1972). See also Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's
Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 364 (1969); Devins & McCoy,
Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1984); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (1984); Houck, With Charity for
All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1526-30 (1984).
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Nontaxpayer Standing
Two Supreme Court decisions this past Term provide a focus for
this inquiry. South Carolina v. Regan3 involved a state that paid no
taxes to the federal government, but wanted to protect the right of
others to claim a federal income tax exclusion for interest paid on
state bonds. Allen v. Wright4 involved the parents of schoolchildren
who challenged the granting of charitable exemptions to schools
with allegedly discriminatory admissions policies. Together the
cases serve as examples of why plaintiffs who do not directly owe the
Treasury anything might attack a rule that collects either too much
tax (the South Carolina claim) or too little (the Allen claim).
This article will proceed in three parts. In part I, I review the
background of the South Carolina and Allen litigation and explore the
different results the Court and Congress have reached with respect
to nontaxpayer suits that seek to lower or raise someone else's in-
come taxes. Part II examines the costs and benefits of nontaxpayer
standing. I will argue that the pervasiveness, neutrality, and intri-
cacy of the income tax distinguish it from other areas of federal law
and justify a reluctance to permit nontaxpayers to invoke judicial
review of disputes over the interpretation of income tax rules. Fi-
nally, in Part III, I return to the South Carolina and Allen decisions to
discuss the choices the courts and Congress now face with respect to
nontaxpayer standing.
I. The Doctrinal Background of Nontaxpayer Standing
South Carolina and Allen typify two different forms of nontaxpayer
standing problems, each with distinct doctrinal underpinnings.
South Carolina involves jus tertii standing, by which the nontaxpayer
asserts an interest in preventing the taxation of someone else, usu-
ally because the nontaxpayer bears the real incidence of the tax. In
effect, the litigant attempts to assert another's right to resist a tax.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has treated the question ofjus ter-
tii standing in the income tax area as coterminous with its interpre-
tation of the Anti-Injunction Act,5 an 1867 statute that restricts
lawsuits interfering with the collection of federal taxes. Before South
Carolina, the Court had given broad effect to the Anti-Injunction Act
and barred jus tertii claims even when the plaintiff could show that
he/she bore the full burden of a tax nominally levied on another,
3. 104 S. Ct. 1107 (1984).
4. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
5. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 475 (codified at I.R.C. § 7421(a) (Prentice-Hall,
1984) (hereinafter cited by Code section only)).
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and that the imposition of the tax interfered with a right arguably
protected by the Constitution.
6
Allen involves enforcement standing. In such cases, the
nontaxpayer asserts an interest, either moral or economic, in seeing
that an adversary or competitor pays its taxes in full. The plaintiff
wishes to step into the Internal Revenue Service's shoes to prose-
cute a claim for taxes owed to the government. Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization7, the only modern case before Allen
in which the Court gave plenary consideration to enforcement
standing, suggested an unwillingness, if not a flat refusal, to recog-
nize such suits. Although later I will try to show the common
problems these two forms of nontaxpayer standing present, a review
of their separate characteristics may clarify what each puts at stake.
A. Jus Tertii Standing
In South Carolina, the state wanted the Court to address the consti-
tutionality of Section 103() of the Internal Revenue Code,8 which
denies owners of state and municipal bonds issued after June 30,
1983 the traditional interest exclusion unless the issuer has put the
obligation in registered form. Although the nominal tax liability
under this provision falls on bond holders, issuers have powerful
reasons to believe that they will bear most of the economic costs of
taxation. South Carolina invoked jus tertii standing to assert its
bondholders' right to exclude interest from unregistered bonds,
largely because the state's own material stakes were so closely tied
to the bondholders' tax liability.
An important feature of South Carolina's claim to standing was
the importance of timing. The mechanism by which the incidence of
the tax on bond interest would shift to the state would be contracts
with the bond purchasers, and these bargains would be struck at the
outset of the transaction. Unless the state somehow could make the
size of its interest obligation contingent on a subsequent challenge
to Section 103(j), it would bear the cost of the inclusion even if
bondholders subsequently prevailed in a suit attacking that provi-
sion's constitutionality. For those bonds issued in advance of a
bondholder courtroom victory, the state would get no relief from
6. See Bob Jones University v. Simon (Bob Jones I), 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Alexander
v. "Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
7. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
8. I.R.C. § 103(j), as amended by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsiblity Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 310(b)(l), 96 Stat. 324, 599.
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the allegedly unconstitutional provision unless it could maintain a
pretransactional suit.
A suit by prospective bond purchasers could also clear up the un-
certainty over Section 103(j)'s validity, but such litigation would run
afoul of the well-established limits on the right of nominal taxpayers
to litigate the tax consequences of a transaction that has not yet oc-
curred. The dominant legislative signal in this area has been the
Anti-Injunction Act. This provision declares that "no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall
be maintained in any court." The statute's message, which courts
generally have taken to heart, is the exclusivity of the authorized
procedures for taxpayers to challenge a tax. These normally require
both a completed transaction that has resulted in a tax and a tax-
payer who opposes the assessment.' 0
South Carolina's strategy was to find an implied exemption from
the Anti-Injunction Act. Arguing that it constituted the kind of
nontaxpayer that ought to have the right to challenge a tax, the
State hoped to obtain an even greater benefit: freedom from the
Act's additional requirement that litigation follow assessment. In
other words, South Carolina soughtjus tertii standing not simply to
establish its right to sue, but more importantly to open a path for
pretransactional litigation of its constitutional claim.
In two earlier cases similarly situated nontaxpayers had failed to
carve such an exemption out of the Anti-Injunction Act. Bob Jones
University v. Simon (Bob Jones I)l involved a school that, because of a
change in government policy toward racially discriminatory private
education, faced the loss of the charitable exemption it had enjoyed
for thirty years. Although a lost exemption would have had some
direct impact on the school's taxes, donors who no longer could de-
duct contributions would have borne the most serious tax conse-
quences. The school believed that it would absorb the economic
cost of these lost deductions, because donors would give to other
charities rather than make nondeductible contributions. Asserting
the right of its contributors to deduct their donations, the University
asked a district court immediately to restore its exemption by ruling
9. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1984).
10. The normal procedure for contesting an income tax assessment requires either a
deficiency notice by the Internal Revenue Service which a taxpayer then may challenge
in the Tax Court, see I.R.C. §§ 6212-13, or payment of the tax followed by a refund suit
in either a district court or the claims court, see I.R.C. § 7422 (1984); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1). For the instances where the Code authorizes pre-assessment litigation, see
note 13 infra.
11. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
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either that the government had misinterpreted the statutory re-
quirements for charitable exemption, or that the statute as inter-
preted violated various First Amendment, equal protection and due
process rights.
Alexander v. "Americans United, "Inc. 12 presented different facts but
similar legal issues. A nonprofit educational organization devoted
to promotion of separation of church and state faced a loss of ex-
empt status because it had violated Section 501(c)(3)'s explicit ban
on attempts to influence legislation. The organization still enjoyed
freedom from income tax because it qualified as an exempt social
welfare organization under Section 501 (c) (4), but its supporters lost
their contribution deductions. Also asserting its contributors' right
to deduct contributions, "Americans United," without waiting for
an actual tax assessment, asked a court to rule that the restrictions
on legislative lobbying violated the First Amendment.
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that disruption in dona-
tions caused by a threatened loss of tax exemption did not justify
reading another exception into the Anti-Injunction Act. Instead the
institutions would have to surrender their exemptions and then
bring refund suits to get them back. The Court recognized that
most of the nominal tax liability fell on benefactors, not the institu-
tions. It accepted the premise that the diversion of contributions
during the period of uncertain deductibility would cause the institu-
tions to suffer irreparable losses, and it understood that both as-
serted constitutional claims for which the federal judiciary provided
the most appropriate forum. The Court nevertheless concluded
that none of these factors justified preenforcement judicial interfer-
ence with the tax system.13
Bob Jones University and "Americans United" each faced some
direct liability under the federal unemployment tax as a result of the
12. 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
13. Congress responded to these holdings two years later by enacting I.R.C. § 7428,
which permits an organization denied exempt status under, inter alia, Section 501 (c)(3),
to seek a declaratory judgment reviewing its classification. Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1717. This procedure was modeled partly
on I.R.C. § 7476, which since 1974 has permitted the Tax Court to issue declaratory
judgments concerning the qualification of employee benefit plans. Sections 7428 and
7476 subsequently provided a model for I.R.C. § 7478, which permits issuers of state or
municipal bonds to obtain Tax Court review of decisions concerning the exclusion of
their interest under I.R.C. § 103. The 1976 Act also added I.R.C. § 7477, which permit-
ted the Tax Court to issue declaratory judgments as to whether certain transfers of do-
mestic corporate property to foreign corporations have a tax avoidance purpose, but
Congress recently repealed this provision. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, § 131 (e)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 664. These are the only exceptions to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act expressly authorized by Congress.
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loss of charitable status. 14 Because of this burden, each institution
could obtain post-assessment judicial review of its constitutional
claims. The cases left open the questions whether the Act would
apply where the aggrieved party has no direct access to judicial re-
view, and whether the possibility of a related party's refund suit
could substitute for a lack of direct access. 15 South Carolina forced
the Court to answer these questions, because the state would not
owe any taxes to the federal government regardless of the status of
its bonds under the Internal Revenue Code. In terms of payments
to the U.S. Treasury, South Carolina had only its bondholders' lia-
bility to defend.
Seizing on the no-direct-access opening, the South Carolina Court
created the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that the State
needed to get pretransactional clearance. The majority ruled that
the Act does not barjus tertii standing in any case where a person
asserts only the tax claims of third parties and therefore has no
power to bring a refund suit. It dismissed the possibility that bond-
holders could vindicate the state's interests. Even though the tax
liability fell on the holders, the Court explained, the constitutional
rights at stake belonged to the state. Moreover, the Court saw no
guarantee that holders who bought unregistered bonds would con-
test their taxability.' 6
Having swept aside the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court did not
look for positive congressional authorization to entertain a suit
seeking prospective relief. It seemed to regard the Anti-Injunction
Act as the exclusive barrier tojus tertii standing, rather than as only
one obstacle faced by nontaxpayer suits to resist taxation. Perhaps
the Court believed no further inquiry was necessary, as the case
otherwise fell within the Court's original jurisdiction, the state had
an unmistakable economic interest in the litigation, the cause of ac-
tion could be implied directly from the Constitution, and prospec-
tive relief is customary for plaintiffs who can show a live case or
controversy.1 7 The decision may turn on nothing more than a par-
ticular conception of the federalism rights asserted by the state that
enforcement exclusively by individual citizens might demean. The
assertion of states' rights by private citizens, however, is the norm in
14. See I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8) (1984) (unemployment tax exemption for charities).
15. See 416 U.S. at 746, 747 n.21.
16. 104 S. Ct. at 1115-16.
17. The federal judiciary traditionally has entertained lawsuits based on constitu-
tional claims without looking for express legislative authorization. See, e.g., Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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suits involving state immunity from federal taxation.' 8 Moreover,
none of the state's constitutional claims seem substantial on the
merits. Absent an upheaval in the constitutional law of federalism,
it is inconceivable that Section 103(j) impermissibly encroaches on
any protected area of state autonomy.19 Nor can the decision easily
be explained as a product of the peculiar features of the Court's
original jurisdiction. Three justices offered just such a rationale for
the result, but the others avoided this path.
20
By failing to confine its holding either to original jurisdiction
cases or to constitutional claims, the Court left open the possibility
that it will permit a suit attacking a tax, including a potential tax on a
prospective transaction, whenever the plaintiff can show that the
taxation of some other party will affect its economic interests and
that it has no direct means of challenging the tax. If the Court
means to entertain this possibility, thenjus tertii standing has taken
on new and potentially gigantic dimensions. In the absence of any
ready means of cabining the decision, its indeterminancy invites ex-
pansion. Although South Carolina by no means realizes the full po-
tential ofjus tertii standing in federal tax cases, it has opened a door
that had seemed tightly shut.
B. Enforcement Standing
Allen involved citizens who believed the government was not col-
lecting enough taxes. The plaintiffs, parents of black children at-
tending public schools in the process of desegregation, asserted that
the Internal Revenue Service too readily recognized the charitable
exemption of private schools that may practice racial discrimina-
tion. 21 They contended that this underenforcement of the Code's
18. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S.
601 (1895), the case in which the Supreme Court first immunized state bond interest
from federal income taxation, was brought by a taxpayer, not a state. For other cases in
which individuals asserted state immunity from federal taxation, see Collector v. Day, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570
(1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932). Elsewhere the Court
has declared that "the constitutional nature of a taxpayer's claim, as distinct from its
probability of success, is of no consequence under the Anti-Injunction Act." Alexander
v. "Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 (1974).
The procedural posture of Pollock was unusual, as the suit was not against the United
States, but rather by a shareholder to restrain a corporation from paying the income tax.
Although the Anti-Injunction Act would seem to have barred thisjus terii suit, the Court
treated the government's waiver of all objections to jurisdiction as sufficient to permit a
ruling on the merits. 157 U.S. at 554.
19. See, e.g., 104 S. Ct. at 1127-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 1123-27 (O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
21. Allen is one of four Supreme Court decisions spawned by protracted and multi-
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implicit "no-exemption-for-discrimination" principle encouraged
white flight that frustrated the right of their children to an inte-
grated education. They asked for an injunction ordering the Service
to require private schools located in or serving desegregating school
districts to implement a strict affirmative action program if they
wished to enjoy the charitable exemption.
The idea that private citizens have some power to step into the
shoes of the federal government to prosecute violations of regula-
tory legislation has been around a long time, although its doctrinal
labels have varied. When the citizen seeks relief for some discrete
front litigation over the eligibility of racially discriminatory private schools for charitable
exemption under the federal tax laws. The government reversed its position twice dur-
ing the course of the dispute, forcing changes in the identity and interests of the litigants
that make a synopsis of the cases unusually difficult. At different moments in the same
litigation the government was opposed by black parents who claimed that the IRS ille-
gally favored segregated schools, and by schools and white parents who argued that the
IRS had denied tax advantages without the authority to do so.
Parents of black Mississippi schoolchildren brought the first suit in 1969. They at-
tacked the charitable exemption segregated schools then enjoyed. After the parents ob-
tained a preliminary injunction forbidding further exemptions for Mississippi schools,
the IRS announced that it would exclude all segregated schools from the privileges of
charitable status. The intervenors, parents of white children attending these schools,
took an appeal to the Supreme Court, which summarily affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion to forbid exemption. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
Bob Jones University, an admittedly discriminatory school, then tried to obtain a de-
claratory judgment restoring its exemption. It argued both that the Internal Revenue
Code required exemption, and that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment
forbade withholding the exemption if discrimination were based on religious belief. Bob
Jones I held that the Anti-Injunction Act forbade this suit.
The next stage of the litigation came when Bob Jones paid its taxes and filed a refund
suit. At about the same time, black parents filed a nationwide class action in the federal
district court for the District of Columbia that accused the IRS of using a too narrow
definition of racial discrimination to deny exemption to schools. The Fourth Circuit
rejected BobJones's claim, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Before argument,
the government again reversed field and announced that the Code did not contain a
special rule denying charitable status to segregated schools. It offered to refund Bob
Jones's taxes and asked the Court to dismiss the suit as moot.
Before the Supreme Court could act on the mootness issue, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit sustained the black parents' claim that the government
had denied too few exemptions and ordered the issuance of an injunction forbidding the
IRS to recognize any racially discriminatory school as a charity. Wright v. Regan, No.
80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982). Rather than opposing the lower court's injunction at
that time, the government withdrew its suggestion of mootness in Bob Jones. The
Supreme Court proceeded to hear arguments, with the government supporting Bob
Jones's exemption claim and the NAACP, a specially selected amicus curiae, maintaining
that the prior no-exemption policy was correct. In Bob Jones University v. United States
(Bob Jones II), 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court ruled against the taxpayer and upheld
denial of the exemption. The next Term, in Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984), the
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and threw out its injunction on the ground that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. For further discussion of this controversy,
see Cohen, Exempt Status for Segregated Schools: Does the Constitution Permit Lower Standards
for Tax Benefits Than for Direct Grants? 17 TAx NOTES 259 (1982); Stephan, Bob Jones
University v. United States: Public Policy in Search of Tax Policy, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 33, 53-
58.
81
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injury traceable to a violation of a federal statute, the Court usually
asks whether the legislation contains an implied cause of action for
private parties. When the relief sought is not specific to the citizen,
but rather a generalized effort to end some illegal course of action,
the Court tends to talk about the issue in terms of standing and to
use doctrinal formulations of its own devise-"injury in fact," "cau-
sation," and "zone of interests"-to determine whether the citizen
can sue. In both cases, however, the core question is whether a pri-
vate plaintiff can share in the government's power to enforce a par-
ticular norm or limitation. The Court has never discussed why it
treats these functionally equivalent problems so differently, looking
to legislative signals in the case of implied causes of actions, and to
its own common law for standing.
At some level the differences are unjustified. When the claim of
illegality rests on a statutory violation, the lurking question always is
whether private enforcement conforms to the legislative scheme or
otherwise serves the purposes of Congress. As the Court observed
on one occasion, "[e]ssentially, the standing question . . . is
whether the . . . statutory provision on which the claim rests prop-
erly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position
a right to judicial relief."' 22 Couched this way, the existence of en-
forcement standing becomes a problem for which no universal solu-
tion exists, but rather a matter courts must confront anew with each
statutory scheme. The most that the Supreme Court can do is artic-
ulate general principles of interpretation so that lower courts and
Congress can know which aspects of legislation will signal the exist-
ence of private enforcement, and which will not.
The implied-cause-of-action decisions come close to such a stat-
ute-specific approach, although the failure of the Court to agree on
general interpretive principles has led to a hodge-podge of out-
comes in the cases. 23 When the Court instead employs general
22. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). David Currie has pronounced this
statement "the soundest sentence the Supreme Court has uttered on this troublesome
subject within human memory." Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SuP. CT. REV.
41, 41. As he immediately points out, however, "the Court has generally ignored its
own good counsel." Id.
23. The fullest debate among the Justices over this issue appears in Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist,J., concurring); id. at
718-30 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). Among the current
members of the Court, it appears that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would
imply private enforcement power absent some clear countervailing signal from Con-
gress; that Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist would
apply the opposite presumption; and that Justices Blackmun and White take an ad hoc
approach to this question. For the views from the academy, see generally Posner, Eco-
nomics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 263, 278-
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standing doctrine, the linkage of its analysis to the particular fea-
tures of a legislative scheme is less direct. To have standing to en-
force a federal statute, a private person must allege "injury in fact,"
show that the injury affects something within the "zone of interests"
protected or regulated by the statute, and demonstrate that his in-
jury is "fairly traceable" to the alleged violation of the statute.
24 Of
these three tests, only the "zone of interests" inquiry explicitly looks
to signs of legislative purpose. A review of the cases suggests that,
at least for the Supreme Court, standing decisions turn largely on
the majority's sympathies toward particular regulatory schemes, but
only dissenters and academic commentators openly make this
assertion.
25
Indeterminancy in the application of doctrine does not obscure
one indisputable feature of the standing cases: outside the tax area,
the Court has shown substantial, albeit intermittent, leniency in
granting standing, but in tax cases the Court has never found an
acceptable occasion for private enforcement. Before Allen, the
Court had given plenary consideration to only one case, although it
had ignored the issue in two others.2 6 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization27 ruled that indigents who had been refused
service at private hospitals lacked standing to attack those institu-
80 (1982); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195
(1982).
24. See the cases cited in note 1 supra. With respect to nonconstitutional cases,Judge
Scalia has argued for collapsing standing doctrine into an implied-cause-of-action in-
quiry through reshaping of the "zone-of-interests" prong into a congressional-intent
test. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 898-99 (1983). In at least one recent case, the Court appears to
have followed this path. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 104 S. Ct. 2450
(1984). For an excellent review of the zone-of-interests standard that also points in this
direction, see the discussion of the doctrine in Leaf Tobacco Exporters Ass'n, Inc. v.
Block, 749 F.2d 1106, 1110-13 (4th Cir. 1984) (Wilkinson, J.).
25. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3341 at n. 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing academic commentators).
26. In Bob Jones H, what had been at the time of the grant of certiorari a traditional
taxpayer's suit resisting an exaction became, as a result of a reversal of the government's
position shortly before briefing and oral argument, a nontaxpayer suit to enforce collec-
tion. See note 21 supra. Perhaps because of the timing of this unusual turn of events, the
Court did not address the standing question. In Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (per
curiam), aff'g Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel),
the Court affirmed without oral argument or full briefing a judgment in a case that had
begun as a nontaxpayer enforcement suit challenging the charitable status of racially
discriminatory schools. Coit's procedural posture mirrored that of Bob Jones II: a mid-
litigation switch in the government's position had eliminated the dispute between the
plaintiffs and the government, but intervenors whose future tax liability was affected by
the ruling then appealed. See note 21 supra. The Court's brief order did not attempt to
untangle the standing issue, and a disparaging footnote in Bob Jones I appeared to under-
cut whatever precedential force Coit otherwise might have. 416 U.S. at 740 n.11.
27. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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tions' tax exemptions. The plaintiffs wished to reverse a Revenue
Ruling that had dropped free service to the poor as a prerequisite to
the Service's recognition of a hospital's charitable exemption. 28
The Court ruled that the causal link between the tax exemption and
service to indigents was too speculative. It believed that whatever
injuries the plaintiffs had suffered were not "fairly traceable" to the
government's allegedly incorrect interpretation of the charitable
exemption.
29
Allen followed Eastern Kentucky in relying on the causation require-
ment to deny standing. The plaintiffs claimed that the Service,
through lackluster enforcement, was disobeying the Code's implicit
prohibition of charitable exemption for racially discriminatory pri-
vate schools, and that this inaction promoted racial segregation in
the public schools their children attended. Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the majority, responded that this allegation failed to identify
an injury that was "fairly traceable" to the claimed violation of law.
The plaintiffs had not alleged either that private schools had
drained off substantial numbers of white students from the public
schools their children attended, nor that the segregated private
schools in their environs would change their practices if the Service
stepped up enforcement of the charitable exemption prohibition.
Nor could the plaintiffs seek judicial relief for the denigration in-
flicted on all black people when the government supports racial dis-
crimination. Absent some evidence that they had suffered in some
particular way from the granting of the exemption, the plaintiffs
could not attack it.30
While Eastern Kentucky and Allen have the virtue of consistency,
each gives its critics plenty of ammunition. Any decision resting on
causation requires assumptions about the way the world works that
cannot be made with complete assurance, but that in Allen seem es-
pecially vulnerable to attack. If the charitable exemption has no be-
havioral consequences, a proposition on which Allen's standing
analysis seems to rest, one wonders why the Court went to so much
28. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, modifying Rev. Rul 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
29. 426 U.S. at 42-44. Justice Stewart, in a concurrence, declared that he could not
"now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose
own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax
liability of someone else." Id. at 46.
30. 104 S. Ct. at 3326-30. Allen, unlike Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
was not unanimous. Justice Brennan, who had joined the judgment but not the opinion
in Eastern Kentucky, dissented in Allen, as did Justice Stevens, who had not participated in
the earlier case, and Justice Blackmun, who had joined the Court opinion in Eastern Ken-
tucky. Justice Marshall, who had joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Eastern Kentucky, did
not participate in Allen.
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trouble a year earlier in Bob Jones University v. United States (Bob Jones
H)31 to forbid the exemption of discriminatory schools. Although
one may read Bob Jones II as dealing only with the symbolic wrong
entailed in any government involvement with discrimination, much
of the opinion seems to express the belief that tax exemption actu-
ally encourages the exempted activity and thereby, if extended to
segregated schools, would increase the amount of discrimination in
the world.
32
Allen's feeble effort to distinguish Coit v. Green,33 the summary af-
firmance of the case that originally developed the no-exemption-for-
discrimination rule, fuels the fire. The Court observed that Coit had
involved only private schools in Mississippi, where overwhelming
evidence documented the use of private schools to frustrate public
school desegregation and the importance of tax exemption to these
institutions.34 This observation, however, seems to confirm the
standing of the Allen plaintiffs to seek some relief, although not nec-
essarily on a nationwide basis. Presumably the exact claims made in
Allen may be resurrected in the still ongoing Coit litigation, unless
the distinction drawn represents simply an inept attempt to avoid
overruling an ill-considered precedent. 35
One can also subject Eastern Kentucky and Allen to a different kind
31. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The contrast between the two cases seems even starker
when one recalls that the government in Bob Jones I withdrew its suggestion of mootness
only because of the lower court injunction, which Allen later threw out. See id. at 585 n.9;
note 21 supra.
32. "[I]n enacting both § 170 and § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax bene-
fits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that
serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of
the same kind." 461 U.S. at 587-88. See also id. at 587 n.10: "[The exemption] seek[s] to
achieve the . . . basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations
through the grant of tax benefits." Justice Stevens' dissent in Allen makes the point even
more explicitly: "If the granting of preferential tax treatment would 'encourage' private
segregated school [sic] to conduct their 'charitable' activities, it must follow that the
withdrawal of the treatment would 'discourage' them, and hence promote the process of
desegregation." 104 S. Ct. at 3343.
33. 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
34. 104 S. Ct. at 3331-32.
35. The Court's attempt to distinguish Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973),
which affirmed a lower court injunction forbidding a state from providing free textbooks
to racially discriminatory private schools, reinforces this conclusion. The plaintiffs in
Norwood also were parties to a school desegregation order covering the same state. In
the eyes of the Allen majority, this preexisting court order created the legal interest that
the state's aid to segregated private schools injured. If a prior court order suffices to
bootstrap standing, then the original plaintiffs in Coit apparently have an interest that
the Service's allegedly lackluster enforcement injures. The upshot of Allen, then, would
be a simple amendment to the complaint to include some Mississippi plaintiffs, who then
would have standing to seek at least statewide relief against the Internal Revenue
Service.
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of criticism. By focusing on causation rather than the zone-of-inter-
ests inquiry, the Court has neglected what could be a crucial issue:
what is there in the language of the statute, its legislative or adminis-
trative history, its structure or purpose to support an inference of
private enforcement? If Congress meant to provide for private en-
forcement of the obligations it created in the Internal Revenue
Code, why should the Court obstruct this choice? 36 If, on the other
hand, one fairly can infer a more general congressional decision not
to include claims like those asserted by the Allen plaintiffs within the
zone of interests protected by the Internal Revenue Code, then why
leave open the prospect of other suits that succeed in surmounting
the causation hurdle?
Consider the standing issue in a recent case. Palestinian mayors
from the West Bank asked a federal court to compel the revocation
of exemptions enjoyed by various Jewish charities. 37 The plaintiffs
alleged that Israel discriminates against Palestinians, a class to which
they belong, and that the charities pass on funds to Israel that sup-
port this discrimination. For purposes of deciding the standing
question, a court must accept as true the factual allegations of dis-
crimination. In addition, the legal argument that the promotion of
such misconduct will disqualify an organization from enjoying the
charitable exemption has some superficial plausibility after Bob Jones
H.38 If all that remained for the case to proceed was an allegation of
personal injury caused by behavior the exemption encourages, then
surely these Palestinians met this burden. Unlike the Allen plaintiffs,
who did not purport to represent any child who had been denied
admission to discriminatory private schools, the Palestinian plain-
tiffs asserted that they have suffered directly from Israel's allegedly
discriminatory acts.3 9
36. The Court tends to regard the express congressional authorization of enforce-
ment as pretermitting the causation inquiry. One device it employs to blink away Article
III objections to standing is the assertion that by empowering identifiable persons to
sue, Congress has created an interest that statutory violations injure. E.g., Havens Re-
alty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982). See generally Logan, Standing to Sue:
A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 37, 59-70, 77-81.
37. Khalafv. Regan, No. 83-2963 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 6, 1983, dismissed with preju-
dice, Jan. 10, 1985).
38. See Stephan, supra note 21, at 71-77. Although the public policy violation alleged
in Khalaf is distinguishable on the ground that the misconduct involves the acts of a
foreign state against its own subjects, some authority exists for the proposition that
United States involvement in actions by a foreign goverment injuring its subjects will be
considered illegal if the same behavior, carried out directly by our government against
United States citizens, would violate our Constitution. Compare United States v. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), with Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International
Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 778-91 (1980).
39. In dismissing the suit for lack of standing, Judge Jackson ruled that the Palestin-
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It hardly seems likely that the same Court that threw out the Allen
litigation would want a tax enforcement suit to become a vehicle for
putting Israel on trial for its West Bank policy. If it has any princi-
pled basis, Allen must mean that the expansion of Bob Jones M's pub-
lic policy limitation on the charitable exemption should proceed by
way of a dialogue between the IRS and Congress, without the hec-
toring of private lawsuits. If this is Allen's objective, however, the
causation inquiry does not do the job.
Another drawback of Allen's focus on causation is the resulting
failure to distinguish constitutional from statutory standing. The
parents asserted two grounds for attacking the Service's approach to
segregated schools: Section 501(c)(3) requires the denial of charita-
ble exemption for schools that do not make a stronger showing of
nondiscrimination than the Service currently requires, and the Fifth
Amendment prohibits these exemptions even if the Internal Reve-
nue Code does not. By following Eastern Kentucky, a case that in-
volved only statutory issues, the Court seemed to treat the
constitutional claim as indistinguishable from the statutory one. But
it hardly seems self-evident that private enforcement of constitu-
tional rights should turn on the same considerations as private en-
forcement of statutory regulation. When the Constitution is the
source of the right asserted, the question of "zone of interests" be-
comes one of constitutional interpretation, not one of deciphering
legislative intent. It may be that the constitutional issue in Allen was
insubstantial, as some of the Court's other decisions suggest; such
an inquiry falls outside the scope of this article.40 The vice of the
ian plaintiffs could not prove that Israel would alter any of its actions in response to the
withdrawal of support produced by a denial of charitable deductions. Khalaf v. Regan,
No. 83-2963, slip op. at 7-8 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1985). The conclusion may be correct, but
one wishes to know more. How large is the flow of contributions passing through the
charity? How much would it decline if donors no longer could deduct their contribu-
tions? How firmly is Israel commited to the allegedly discriminatory policies? Khalaf
addresses none of these questions, although its result would seem to depend on their
answers.
40. Of the various opinions in Allen, only Justice Stevens' dissent acknowledges that
the parents' claim rests in part on the Constitution. 104 S. Ct. at 3347 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). The Court faced a similar argument in Bob Jones I-that the inclusion of ra-
cially discriminatory schools within the charitable exemption amounted to promotion of
segregation in violation of the Due Process Clause-but by resting its decision on statu-
tory grounds it avoided the constitutional issue. See 461 U.S. at 599 n.24.
Some of the Court's decisions over the past fifteen years suggest a judgment, admit-
tedly not articulated, that tax advantages generally, and the charitable exemption in par-
ticular, are the kind of benefit that a government can either withhold or extend without
triggering substantial constitutional constraints. Compare Bob Jones II, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (denial of charitable exemption for church property does not implicate free exer-
cise protection), and Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (de-
nial of charitable exemption does not trigger free speech protection), with Walz v. Tax
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causation inquiry is that it allows the Court to elide this point. As a
result, the relevance of Allen to nonconstitutional assertions of pri-
vate standing to enforce the federal income tax remains obscure.
Taken together, South Carolina and Allen indicate that the rules for
standing in income tax disputes are more restrictive than those in
other areas of federal law, but each suggests that much remains up
for grabs and that some expansion of nontaxpayer standing is con-
ceivable. South Carolina seems to have more immediate potential for
subverting traditional restrictions on nontaxpayer standing, as it
opens up the prospect of persons bearing the incidence of some
other party's tax having full rights to sue to oppose assessment. At
first blush Allen, like Eastern Kentucky before it, seems to forbid all
forms of enforcement standing. But by relegating the issue to an ad
hoc and malleable causation inquiry, while not addressing the more
definitive zone-of-interests test, Allen may contain the seeds of a fu-
ture expansion of enforcement standing.
These openings permit other courts and Congress to consider
whether to cabin judicial review of tax disputes within the present
limits, or to broaden the opportunities for nontaxpayers to chal-
lenge the government's interpretation of the law. When they make
this choice, these bodies must grapple with a central question: In
light of the particular characteristics of the federal income tax sys-
tem, what are the costs and benefits of judicial review of disputes
over the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code? To this I now
turn.
II. The Costs and Benefits of Judicial Supervision of the Tax System
It would be equally absurd to argue either that judicial supervi-
sion provides unalloyed benefits to society, or that it inflicts only
costs on an unwitting polity. Withoutjudicial review, the interpreta-
tion of legislation would turn on the desires of those currently in
control of the executive branch and, to a lesser degree, the actions
Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (allowance of exemption for church property does not
violate establishment clause). This judgment, to the extent it can be justified, seems to
reflect a kind of right/privilege distinction that recognizes the constitutional insignifi-
cance of some governmental actions and inactions. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (issuance of liquor license to racially discriminatory club does
not constitute sufficient state involvement to trigger constitutional protection). That
some forms of governmental activity are too mundane to demand searching constitu-
tional scrutiny seems a reasonable, although not an inevitable, proposition; that the
charitable exemption should constitute such a form is far more debatable, although my
own uneasy belief is that it may. See generally Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 2; note 67
infra and accompanying text.
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of current members of Congress. A Congress facing the enactment
of legislation would have no means of projecting its will into the
future. 41 With total judicial review, on the other hand, we would
sacrifice both administrative expertise and democratic
accountability.
As usually is the case, some balance must be struck. In determin-
ing how much judicial review of the income tax system we should
want, a conventional cost-benefit analysis seems an appropriate ap-
proach. My contention is that because of three important character-
istics of the federal income tax-what I will call its pervasiveness,
neutrality, and intricacy-judicial review may entail substantial costs
without great benefits. The risk that expanded opportunities to in-
voke judicial review will cause more harm than good should deter
courts from arrogating to themselves more supervisory power than
Congress has explicitly provided. In practice, this means courts
should avoid purposive interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code that would permit nontaxpayer suits in situations where Con-
gress has not positively authorized such litigation. Legislative deci-
sions to permit greater judicial review in turn should reflect full
consideration of the costs and benefits identified below.
A. The Distinctive Aspects of the Federal Income Tax
Rather than offer a general critique of private enforcement of
public law, I will focus on the particular problems created by
nontaxpayer litigation of federal income tax issues. Although some
of the points I will make about the costs and benefits of these suits
may apply to other areas of law such as environmental regulation or
civil rights, several aspects of federal income taxation are sufficiently
distinct to suggest that a special cost-benefit calculus applies. As a
result, one can have reservations about nontaxpayer litigation of tax
disputes without necessarily opposing more active judicial review of
other matters.
1. Pervasiveness
Three characteristics of the income tax seem especially relevant to
debates over the structure of dispute resolution and enforcement.
First, the income tax is pervasive. Unlike other forms of federal leg-
islation, which affect discrete areas of activity, the Internal Revenue
41. See Landes & Posner, The Independent Judirian, in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.
L. & ECON. 875, 878-79 (1975). The point in the text is not a rock-bottom justification
for judicial review, but rather a minimalist argument accepted by even strong skeptics of
an activist judiciary.
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Code touches most households and most forms of economic behav-
ior. Roughly a hundred million individual tax returns are filed each
year, which with joint returns and dependents means that the over-
whelming majority of Americans directly participate in the income
tax system. Moreover, there are few decisions a person can make
that do not have federal income tax consequences, whether the
choice involves kinds of livelihood (taxable salary versus untaxed
leisure, intangible satisfaction, or fringe benefits), living arrange-
ments (deductible home mortgage interest or nondeductible rent),
marital status (different rate tables) or number of children
(dependents).
Because of the income tax's pervasiveness, the reservoir of poten-
tial disputants and the overall amounts of liability that disputes can
put at stake are enormous relative to other kinds of public law.
Although suits can be both expensive and risky, a challenge by even
a single foolhardy individual can implicate a substantive rule that
may affect millions of taxpayers and billions of dollars. As a result,
any increase in the uncertainty of the system, when multiplied by the
enormous number of instances in which the uncertainty can affect
behavior, will have distinctively high costs.
In addition, the huge number of returns makes voluntary compli-
ance essential to the system's continued operation. Uncertainty and
controversy can demoralize taxpayers as a group by encouraging
them to resolve more doubts in their own favor. Any decrease in
voluntary cooperation with the taxing authories will increase the
costs of the system by making necessary the substitution of less de-
sirable means of enforcement.
42
2. Neutrality
Second, many of the rules in the Internal Revenue Code have no
regulatory object. Indeed, a generally accepted goal of tax law is
neutrality, that is, the minimization of distortion in the making of
economic choices. Many counter-examples exist, of course, as pur-
posively interventionist incentives and penalties enter the Code with
increasing frequency. The Treasury's Tax Expenditure Budget at-
tempts to list these provisions, although some of its designations are
controversial and few of the quasi-subsidies it identifies represent
new manipulations of the tax system.43 Nevertheless, a surprisingly
42. On the relationship between complexity, taxpayer morale, and voluntary compli-
ance, see, e.g., 1 U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT 9, 16-17
(1984) (hereinafter cited as TREASURY REPORT).
43. See, e.g., Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309
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large number of income tax rules do not classify taxpayers or trans-
actions as good or bad. As a result, the number of instances in
which groups have occasion to compete for rewards or to fight over
penalties are fewer than with most other statutory schemes.
The degree of neutrality attained by the present system is to a
large extent a product of its pervasiveness. Because federal income
taxation embraces so many individuals and transactions, it is harder
to isolate any clearly defined interest group with a significantly dis-
proportionate incentive to influence the administrative process.
The theory of public choice teaches that regulations that affect many
members of a large group with various and opposing interests will
tend to impose some hardship on everyone, rather than produce ob-
vious victories for particular participants. 44 Although the income
tax's pervasiveness does not guarantee that the Treasury can remain
immune from what administrative law scholars call "capture," it
does decrease the likelihood that the taxing authorities systemati-
cally will favor discrete groups at the expense of the general public.
The most recent evidence that the system attains a surprisingly
high degree of neutrality in practice comes from the 1984 tax re-
form proposals put out by the Department of the Treasury. The
Treasury's claim that its plan can fundamentally reshape and sim-
plify the federal income tax without disproportionately harming any
major class of taxpayers suggests that most taxpayers bear a share of
the costs of flaws in the status quo, even though in isolation differ-
ent provisions seem to impose unfair burdens on particular
groups. 45 It appears that even the present system's blunders are
fairly neutral. And to the extent that tax rules, by design or inadver-
tence, do not create particular classes of beneficiaries, there exist no
individuals who can assert a special interest in their enforcement.
3. Intricacy
A third aspect of the income tax, one related to the second, is its
intricacy. The provisions of the Code are complex, and often they
complement and offset each other in ways not immediately apparent
to the casual observer. Although many rules, in isolation, seem to
(1972); Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAxJ.
244 (1969); Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16
J. L. & EcoN. 193 (1973); Stephan, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1357, 1403-04 (1984); Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax-The
Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262 (1981). On the antiquity of preferences in the income tax,
see Goode, Lessons from Seven Decades of Income Taxation, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 19-
22 (J. Pechman ed. 1984).
44. See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 31-33, 38-45, 118-20
(2d ed. 1963); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 189-99 (1962).
45. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 42, at 37-61.
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offer tax breaks to a few, in aggregate these provisions touch so
many taxpayers that virtually everyone benefits to some degree. 46
No other federal legislative scheme has so many feints and parries,
so many benefits and burdens that are dispensed with one hand and
promptly erased by the other. The result is a system that permits
well-organized interests to believe they enjoy special benefits, when
the reality is one of standoff.
Intricacy, of course, hardly guarantees neutrality. It is conceiva-
ble that complex rules may have a mystifying effect. Perhaps convo-
lution in the tax law enables discrete groups to escape with tax
preferences that could not survive if expressed in straightforward
terms. A famous example is former Section 1240, a facially neutral
and complex provision of the Internal Revenue Code designed to
benefit a class of one (movie magnate Louis B. Mayer, who wanted
to cash out of a retirement plan at capital gains rates).47 Other ex-
amples abound.
Whether the Code's intricacy promotes or detracts from neutral-
ity depends not only on the effect of intricacy on the legislative pro-
cess, but also on the response of the government's enforcement
practices to the problems and opportunities created by elaborate
and interrelated rules. Benign tax administrators can exploit intri-
cacy to create offsetting advantages that hold interest groups at bay
while achieving substantial neutrality among taxpayers. Corrupt
ones can use it to disguise the handing out of special favors. My
impression is that the taxing authorities are honest but
overburdened, and that the only substantial bias that may exist in
enforcement concerns large taxpayers versus small ones. Even this
kind of discrimination, if it exists at all, is ambiguous. The Internal
Revenue Service may back away from wealthy taxpayers because of
the greater resources employed to resist enforcement, but it also
may target this group for more aggressive surveillance because of
the larger stakes involved. The tax system's intricacy can further
either of these purposes.
46. See Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 2, at 86: "[T]he Internal Revenue Code is a
pudding with plums for everyone." For a graph that illustrates the evenness of the dis-
tribution of "tax preferences" over income classes, seeJ. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY
76 (4th ed. 1983).
47. See I.R.C. § 1240 (1954), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1901(a)(139), 90 Stat. 1520, 1787; Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Spe-
cial Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147 n.4 (1957). Ironically, the
exceptional treatment enjoyed by Mayer-capital gains characterization of a lump-sum
distribution of retirement benefits-later became the norm for participants in qualified
plans who met certain requirements. Under current law such distributions constitute
capital gain to the extent payments are attributable to pre-1974 service, if the employee
so elects. See I.R.C. § 402(e) (1984).
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A less obvious implication to be drawn from the system's intricacy
is the difficulty of telling when a provision promotes or detracts
from neutrality. Judicial elimination of some special-interest provi-
sions might upset the balance Congress or the Treasury may have
struck between competing interest groups. The fact of intricacy
suggests that those who must pass judgment on the system should
maintain a degree of diffidence toward claims that particular rules
are invalid products of undue influence by groups hostile to the
general interest.
B. The Overlooked Costs
Enforcing even the most desirable rules entails costs. Some costs
are intended as the heart of the rule, such as the penalties rule
breakers must bear. Some are direct and easy to grasp, such as the
investment of resources in the resolution of disputes over the rules.
Less obvious, but of potentially great significance, are the indirect
costs resulting from the avoidance of socially desirable behavior by
persons who fear incurring the more direct enforcement costs.
When the operators of a private school, to use Allen as an example,
shut down their establishment because they want to avoid a dispute
over their charitable exemption, society has lost whatever benefit
the school had produced. More aggressive law enforcement-
whether in the form of more prosecutions or greater penalties-in-
creases all these costs.
4 8
It is also a commonplace that uncertainty in the legal rules tends
to increase both dispute resolution and avoidance costs. Unclear
rules invite both regulators and regulated to guess about the legality
of particular actions, which leads to more disputes with their attend-
ant litigation costs. Moreover, as uncertainty spreads the risk of ille-
gality over wider ranges of conduct, a broader class of actors faces
an incentive to seek other, safer pursuits.
49
One should keep in mind, of course, that either increased en-
forcement or less precision in the statement of rules may produce
benefits that outweigh these costs. More enforcement may increase
the deterrence of harmful behavior. More flexibility in the defini-
tion of rules frustrates their evasion. The point is that one reason-
ably can speak of an optimal level of law enforcement, namely the
degree of enforcement at which the marginal benefits equal the mar-
48. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
49. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG.
STUD. 257 (1974).
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ginal costs, and that enforcement in excess of this level can cause as
much social harm as can inadequate enforcement.
1. The Cost of Reopening Settled Questions
Increased judicial review over income tax disputes entails greater
enforcement costs, whatever benefits it might produce. Not only do
increased opportunities to go to court mean more litigation ex-
penses, but they necessarily create greater uncertainty. The power
to challenge an IRS ruling means reopening what otherwise would
be a settled, even if wrongheaded statement of the law. A clear
statement of the IRS' position lets the taxpayer know where he
stands and allows him to order his affairs accordingly. If the Service
gives him what he wants, he has found a safe harbor;50 if it rules
unfavorably, he can proceed to his second-best alternative (a differ-
ent investment or transaction) without hesitation. But if the tax-
payer knows that the Service does not have the final say, he faces a
greater risk in making the choice between his intended course of
action and the next best alternative. A private enforcement suit
might destroy his safe harbor, or a successful challenge to an un-
friendly ruling might make him regret passing up his preferred
course. In short, judicial review decreases the reliability of IRS rul-
ings, and this decrease is a cost.
Expanding judicial review of tax rulings also may have indirect
effects on government behavior that further increase taxpayer un-
certainty. The Treasury and the IRS might plausibly respond to in-
creased review by cutting back on the opportunities for court
challenges, either because they would want to avoid embarrassing
courtroom losses or because the costs of litigation might weigh too
heavily on their budgets. One way to deter challenges is to issue
fewer pronouncements, and to have those that are issued say less.
But a reduction in the number and breadth of regulations and ad-
vance rulings, either public or private, reduces the amount and qual-
ity of valuable information available to taxpayers about their rights
and liabilities under the tax law.5 1 This decrease too is a cost.
50. On taxpayers' right to rely on published and letter rulings, see, e.g., 4 B. BITrKER,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 110.5.4 (1981); Rogovin, The Four
R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity: A View From Within, 43 TAXES 756
(1965).
51. The NLRB serves as an extreme example of an administrative agency that exer-
cises its interpretive function exclusively through adjudication rather than by rulemak-
ing. Although no one questions the general right of an agency to proceed in this
fashion, the costs are apparent. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974)
(upholding agency's right to proceed through adjudication but alluding to costs); Bern-
stein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
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These uncertainty costs may seem small when viewed in isolation,
but they can mount rapidly. The tax system's pervasiveness multi-
plies them by inflicting uncertainty on so many individuals and
transactions. To the extent that courts allow themselves a general
discretionary power to decide when to permit increased judicial re-
view (as is the case with the standing doctrine and judicially-crafted
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act), review-produced uncertainty
easily can spread throughout the system.
A pair of cases illustrate the unsettling effect on substantive law
that nontaxpayer suits engender. In Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blu-
menthal,52 the owner of a domestic oil well sued the Treasury to
compel harsher taxation of overseas oil producers. His complaint
contended, in essence, that the Treasury allowed his competitors to
treat as creditable expenses, which reduce tax liability dollar-for-
dollar, outlays for which the Code permitted only deductions. If the
courts had allowed the suit to go forward, the entire tax structure of
the overseas oil industry would have come under a cloud, with pre-
dictably adverse effects on energy consumers and investors. Refund
suits by the oil companies in different circuits could have further
muddied the waters. Although action by the Supreme Court or
Congress might eventually have ended the turmoil, during the inter-
val the oil industry would have to act under conditions of substantial
uncertainty with respect to its tax liability. If the suit did succeed in
correcting a distortion in the tax burden facing foreign oil produ-
cers, of course, the benefits of standing might exceed these costs. It
must be recognized, however, that allowing standing inescapably
would have produced substantial costs.
The other example is Allen. That litigation cast in doubt the de-
ductibility of almost all contributions to private schools during the
period the suit was alive, as well as the potential tax liability of
thousands of institutions. In the aggregate, the amount of taxes that
single suit affected must have amounted to billions of dollars.
53
79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
52. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying standing to group of travel agents
seeking to challenge failure of IRS to assess taxes against tax-exempt organizations for
income derived from travel programs), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 94 (1978).
53. Cf. Note, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378, supra note 2, at 406:
A court order should be framed to require the IRS to implement constitutionally
satisfactory procedures for the identification of discriminatory private schools or to
terminate the charitable tax exemption-deduction privileges for all private elemen-
tary and secondary schools. That choice is harsh, but is mandated by the Constitu-
tion's hostility toward intentional racial discrimination.
One wonders why the IRS may stop at private and secondary schools, given the Consti-
tution's equal hostility toward discrimination in university education. The "tax expendi-
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Again, the benefits of the litigation might exceed these costs-I will
return to this point in the next section-but this does not mean we
should ignore the costs that do exist.
2. The Cost of Rules Generated by Courts
The fact of judicial review, with its implication that settled ques-
tions can be reopened, is not the only way in which expanded stand-
ing increases uncertainty costs. Wider opportunities to take
disputes to court force more taxpayers to worry not only about
whether the Service's position will stand, but also about what will
replace it. Because of ingrained common-law conventions and una-
voidable institutional constraints, rules generated by courts tend to
increase, rather than diminish, the tax system's uncertainty.
Relaxed standing requirements would provide the courts with more
opportunities to exercise a method of decision-making that,
whatever its benefits, would entail a substantial increase in the in-
definiteness and inconsistency of tax rules.
a. Indefiniteness
To an extent unparalleled in other areas of federal regulation, the
tax system uses precise if arbitrary numerical rules. The income
tax's pervasiveness requires such bright-line rules, which in turn
contribute to the system's intricacy. Unlike the customary approach
of Congress and the Treasury, the common law method as tradition-
ally practiced by federal judges frustrates the announcement of such
definite guidelines. Although there is nothing inherent in the judi-
cial function that precludes the creation of precise and categorical
rules, judges in our federal courts adhere fairly closely to a style of
decision-making that emphasizes the distinctive aspects of the case
before them at the expense of general principles that might define
rules to guide broad classes of future conduct.
Two instances are typical. When the courts first confronted the
problem of grantor trusts used to shift tax liability to lower-bracket
family members, the rules they announced to deter these avoidance
devices were both broad and vague. "[N]o one fact is normally deci-
sive," explained one opinion; instead a decisionmaker must survey
"all considerations and circumstances" to decide whether the "ben-
ture"-the estimated sum of taxes saved-for charitable contributions by individuals to
educational institutions in fiscal year 1984 was $705 million. See STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAx'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1984-1989, at 14 (1984). When one adds in the value of the income,
transfer, and unemployment tax exemptions to educational institutions and accounts for




efits directly or indirectly retained [by the grantor] blend so imper-
ceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership" that liability
must follow. 54  Although these admonitions had the desired result
of discouraging abusive transactions, they also deterred socially de-
sirable transfers by putting grantors to an all-or-nothing choice.
Congress responded to the problem by doing something the courts,
from lack of habit or expertise, generally will not: it picked a
number. Under the grantor trust rules Congress wrote into the
Code, taxpayers who wish to shift the tax burden of the income
while not competely surrendering the principal know they must de-
sign the trust so that they do not regain the corpus for at least ten
years. This safe harbor dramatically increases the predictability of
tax law in this area without sacrificing much, if any, of its deterrence
objective.
55
The second example involves sale-leasebacks, arrangements by
which the user of a capital good (typically plant or equipment) sells
his property to a third party and then rents it back. These useful
financing devices present difficult tax issues. Too-easy recharacter-
ization of loans as sales with return leases permits a commerce in tax
attributes (principally depreciation deductions and investment cred-
its) that many believe undesirable. Given the broad spectrum of fi-
nancing terms that contract law permits, however, drawing a line
between leases and loans at any particular point seems arbitrary.
The Service published a revenue procedure that had at its heart a
numerical rule: the putative lessor must show that at the end of the
54. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940). See also Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
55. See I.R.C. § 673(a) (1984). I hasten to add that the statutory grantor trust rules,
although much more precise than their common-law predecessors, are quite complex.
See id. §§ 671-79. A grantor must do much more than the simple statement in text sug-
gests. The point is only that this complexity is distinguishable from, and less costly than,
the uncertainty that preceded it.
At first blush the sequence of Clifford followed by the enactment of the statutory rules
may suggest that imprecise common-law rules may have few costs because they provoke
prompt legislative responses. Indeed, muddled common-law rules may even produce
benefits by prodding Congress into enacting precise rules to clarify a previously unset-
tled area of law. But a court can better goad Congress into action by refusing to plug a
hole in the system than by contriving an unsatisfactory solution. Compare the experi-
ence with interest-free loans, where courts refused to cooperate with the Service's at-
tempts to close a lacuna that had emerged in the Code. Within four years of the first
appellate decision rejecting the government's position, Congress enacted a statute giv-
ing the Treasury what it wanted. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 172, 98 Stat. 494, 699-703 (adding I.R.C. § 7872). In the sequence involving the
lease-loan distinction, considered below, a precise administrative rule fell before judicial
intervention, an event that made legislative rescue necessary. For a general discussion
of the developmental structure through which imprecise common-law tax rules become
precise statutory formulae, see Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C." An Essay in Statu-
tory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977).
Yale Law & Policy Review
lease the property still would be worth at least twenty percent of its
original cost.56 The Supreme Court then rejected this bright line in
favor of a much more amorphous inquiry: "[S]o long as the lessor
retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor
status, the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs
for tax purposes. ' 57 But because no one knew with great confi-
dence what qualified as "significant," "genuine," or "traditional,"
lenders either dithered or kept their financing arrangements within
the twenty percent guideline until Congress enacted even more pre-
cise rules.58
There is no reason to suspect that decisions in tax cases brought
by nontaxpayers will attain any greater (or, for that matter, lesser)
degree of precision than do those involving a dispute between a tax-
payer and the government. The vice of relaxing nontaxpayer stand-
ing is that it increases the number of disputes that will wind up in
court, and that judicial resolution will produce rules that generate
greater uncertainty costs. In particular instances the benefits may
outweigh these costs, but what is relevant here is that these costs
will be present.
b. Inconsistency
Inconsistency in tax rules, like indefiniteness, produces uncer-
tainty by reducing the ability of taxpayers to predict confidently the
tax consequences of contemplated actions. To a degree not fully
appreciated, the federal judiciary is organized in a way that pro-
motes inconsistent decisions. The Internal Revenue Service, by
contrast, is relatively monolithic, with interpretive functions con-
fined to headquarters and discretion in the field closely policed by
superiors in Washington. Unification of interpretive authority does
not make consistency inevitable, but the IRS, at least during the ten-
ure of each Commissioner, comes as close to being a single-minded
rulemaker as any sizeable bureaucracy can. To the extent a relaxa-
tion of standing requirements permits courts to substitute their de-
cisions for those of the Service, the likelihood of inconsistency and
resulting taxpayer uncertainty is increased. At least three aspects of
56. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715.
57. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978).
58. Note, "Safe Harbor" as Tax Reform: Taxpayer Election of Lease Treatment, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1648, 1658-63 (1982); see I.R.C. § 168(0(8) (added by Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201(a), 95 Stat. 172, 203, amended by Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 208-09, 96 Stat. 324, 432, 442, and
Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 102(a), 96 Stat. 2365, 2367,




the federal court system disperse decision-making power in a way
that encourages inconsistency: incomplete appellate review; divi-
sion into circuits; and staggered appointments of Supreme Court
justices. Even when a litigant believes a district court has misinter-
preted the law, budgetary constraints may limit his ability to make
an appeal. As a result, notional positions taken by courts of first
instance can go uncorrected for some time. Because decisions of
one court of appeals do not bind other circuits, case law made at the
appellate level also can be contradictory. 59 Supreme Court review
is discretionary, and specialists persistently have complained about
the Court's reluctance to supervise the development of tax law and
even tolerance of longstanding intercircuit conflicts. 60
When the Court does act, it may not contribute much uniformity
to the case law. It has many institutional virtues, but it lacks the
ability to achieve consistency in a body of law involving frequently
recurring questions that do not break down into simple binary
choices. As long as individual justices have the freedom to ap-
proach those cases with different preferences and attitudes, over
time they will be unable to attain consistency in either analysis or
result.6 ' A comparison of Bob Jones I to South Carolina, or of BobJones
H to Allen, illustrates how easy it is for the Court to arrive at conflict-
ing postures in closely related cases.
I do not mean to suggest that judicial review is the only force in
tax law promoting inconsistency and attendant uncertainty. Both
Congress and the Treasury have the power and, on many occasions,
the inclination to change the rules. Taxpayer doubts about the sta-
bility of legislative or administrative decisions can produce uncer-
tainty costs as great as those resulting from inconsistent or
indefinite judicial opinions. But increased judicial review will not
reduce the tendency of Congress or the Treasury to reject, revise, or
reform, and may even exacerbate these problems. An example i's
the sale-leaseback controversy, where the Supreme Court's willing-
ness to substitute its own approach for precise Service guidelines
sufficiently unsettled the law to provoke a series of legislative
reactions.
59. Trial courts, whether U.S. District Courts or the Tax Court, do not regard them-
selves as bound to follow decisions of the courts of appeals other than those of the court
to which an appeal lies. See, e.g., Kast v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1154 (1982).
60. E.g., CourtJurisdiction in Civil Tax Litigation: The Tydings Bills and the Rogovin Report,
22 TAX LAw. 687 (1969); Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV.
1153 (1944).
61. Much of our recent awareness of the institutional impediments to consistent de-
cision-making by a body like the Supreme Court is due to a provocative article by a
scholar who now has an opportunity to apply his insights within the judicial process. See
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
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I am also not arguing that judicial review initiated by
nontaxpayers would produce decisional inconsistency at any greater
rate than what taxpayer litigation already creates. The point again is
that any increase in litigation because of nontaxpayer suits would
spawn some growth in this cost. Given the pervasiveness of tax law
and the multitude of potential disputes that exist, the incremental
cost of this inconsistency could be substantial.
In sum, extending judicial review to more disputes over the inter-
pretation of the income tax statutes would entail unavoidable costs.
These include not only the direct expenses of litigation, but also
those associated with the uncertainty produced both by calling into
question otherwise settled government interpretations and by sub-
stituting potentially indefinite and inconsistent court decisions for
what are more likely to be clear and consistent Service positions.
Because the income tax is so pervasive, the costs of this uncertainty
can mount rapidly.
C. The Uncertain Benefits
Litigation has benefits to the extent it vindicates rights. The least
controversial case for judicial review of tax law interpretation-
where the taxpayer disagrees with the government on an issue that
will affect how much money he will pay into federal coffers-has the
most obvious, or at least the most conventionally acceptable, bene-
fits. At a fairly abstract level of justification, the litigation protects
the citizen's right not to suffer a taking of property without due pro-
cess of law. On a more mundane level, it guards against misalloca-
tion of society's resources by deterring unauthorized and
nonconsensual wealth transfers. 62
The distinctive benefits of nontaxpayer suits such as the South Car-
olina and Allen litigation fall into two general categories: enhanced
pretransaction security and fuller tax enforcement. Preassessment
litigation of an anticipated liability enables taxpayers to determine
tax consequences of transactions before they become irreversible.
Private enforcement fulfills the purposes underlying underenforced
provisions. I will look at these benefits separately.
62. It should be obvious that the present world, which extends some protection to
interests such as property rights, is not the only social ordering imaginable, and very
well may not be the best possible world. In other systems, different claims may become
paramount, and society in particular might attach a higher value to interests such as
those raised in suits to combat racial and other types of discrimination. Although I may
reveal an ideological bias by employing an analysis that presumes the status quo, I leave




1. The Value of Preclearance
Jus tertii standing questions normally arise in the tax area because
someone wants judicial preclearance of a transaction. The connec-
tion between jus tertii standing and preclearance is neither logical
nor necessary-persons who bear the nominal burden of taxation
also may want preclearance, and persons who bear the economic
burden may want jus tertii standing even after a transaction is con-
summated if the nominal taxpayer refuses to defend against taxa-
tion. But the cases that have arisen during the last few decades
suggest that the benefits from jus tertii standing are clearest when a
nontaxpayer who will end up absorbing the cost of a tax needs a
determination of the tax consequences in order to persuade the
nominal taxpayer to undertake a transaction.
The Anti-Injunction Act and the cases that have interpreted it
seem to reflect a consensus that for nominal taxpayers the benefits
of preclearance generally do not justify its cost. The Service runs an
extensive pretransaction review system for taxpayers through its pri-
vate and published rulings. The incremental benefits of further ju-
dicial approval seem too small, as cautious taxpayers can rearrange
their affairs and stubborn ones can incur the liability and litigate or
appeal to Congress for a new rule. But where the nominal and eco-
nomic incidence of taxation diverge substantially, nominal taxpayers
are more likely to substitute a less risky transaction for a deal that
might lead to litigation. In these cases there will be few or no trans-
actions that will enable challenges to the Service's position unless
nontaxpayers can usejus tertii standing to assert nominal taxpayers'
rights, and thereby to seek prospective relief.63
As noted above, costs may accompany these benefits. Most
preclearance suits would produce some negative externalities. First,
as long as they do not have to internalize the full costs to govern-
ment and the court system of the judicial process, some people will
seek more preclearance than is optimal. Too often they will explore
the tax consequences of marginal transactions from which they
could walk away at little cost. A rough analogy exists in the criminal
63. One way nontaxpayers who bear the major portion of a tax's burden can en-
courage nominal taxpayers to undertake a transaction that will permit a challenge to the
tax is through side payments to the taxpayer. These are easily visualized in the case of
municipal bonds. The borrowing state could simply pay sufficient interest to make the
risk of a dispute with the IRS acceptable to the lender. The principal impediment would
be state laws prohibiting dealings that look too much like graft or conflicts of interest.
With charitable contributions, side payments would undermine the premise of the de-
duction and might constitute an independent ground for its denial. In some cases, an
organization might be able to find donors with sufficient ideological commitment to its
goals to risk a court test over the deductibility of a contribution.
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justice system, where subsidies lead to a high level of frivolous ap-
peals and certiorari petitions. 64 In addition, preclearance seekers
who are relatively indifferent to the uncertainty generated by an ef-
fort to overturn the government's position will not take into account
the wishes of those taxpayers who have made their peace with the
status quo.
65
On the other hand, that the benefits of preclearance outweigh its
costs in some instances is suggested by congressional decisions to
permit court review of administrative preclearance in four areas:
charitable exemptions, employee benefit plans, municipal bonds,
and (until recently) transfers of corporate property to foreign cor-
porations.66 In each of these areas, there are ample reasons to be-
lieve that the economic incidence of taxation can shift substantially,
and that otherwise desirable transactions will not take place without
preclearance. All of these exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act in-
volvejus tertii standing, in that the person who may bring suit puts at
issue not only his own tax status, but that of persons who will deal
with him. Because Congress enacted the exceptions in an ad hoc
fashion, reacting to litigation rather than surveying the field to de-
termine the limits of a general preclearance policy, it seems plausi-
ble that other candidates for expandedjus tertii standing exist.
2. Private Enforcement
Taxation can be desirable in particular as well as in general: the
levying of a tax on a specific event or transaction, instead of no levy
at all, may produce benefits for both discrete groups and society as a
whole. Enforcement suits are one means of ensuring the produc-
64. See, e.g., Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971). For
a discussion of the role standing doctrine might play in countering the effects of litiga-
tion subsidies, see Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 645, 670-83 (1973). The analogy between the criminal justice system and private
litigation is only rough because the special subsidies for appeals of criminal convic-
tions-primarily government-provided counsel and forma pauperis procedures-are far
greater than the more general subsidy our society provides litigants through its refusal
to make them internalize all of the costs of the process.
65. One might think that taxpayers always would want more pro-taxpayer rules, but
notwithstanding the expanded choice theorem, at some point a proliferation of choices
can be more trouble than it is worth. To the extent taxpayers bear different costs in
seeking out the various alternatives but compete against each other in relatively efficient
markets, the higher cost bearers will want some restriction of choices. For example,
before the 1981 revisions of the depreciation deduction, taxpayers could choose among
many methods for calculating depreciation. Competitive pressure forced businesses to
survey the results of each method every year, thereby raising accounting and other
transaction costs. Congress, when it imposed a uniform method through the ACRS sys-
tem, believed it was removing a burden that fell disproportionately on smaller busi-
nesses. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981, at 75 (Comm. Print 1981).




tion of such benefits. For example, an enforcement suit can protect
a citizen's right to equal treatment by ensuring that those persons
who share the citizen's salient characteristics shoulder their appro-
priate tax burden. Some claims to equality are bogus (for example,
we do not recognize a right of all citizens to have equal marginal
rates), but others have constitutional stature. A refusal to allow
standing in the latter category of cases thwarts the fulfillment of
those values that this body of constitutional law is meant to serve.
I do not intend to survey here the theories of constitutional law
that support and oppose the recognition of the kinds of rights as-
serted in nontaxpayer suits. It should suffice to note that with re-
spect to its constitutional dimensions, Allen is hard to justify except
as a merits determination disguised as a standing decision. As an
interpretation of the Constitution, of course, the result could be
right or egregiously wrong; I leave it to the constitutional scholars
to debate the point.67 My focus instead is on the benefits of suits
brought by nontaxpayers to protect rights and interests sounding
exclusively in the Internal Revenue Code.
Private enforcement of the tax laws could overcome those sys-
temic barriers that currently prevent optimal collection. Supporters
of nontaxpayer standing to compel enforcement suggest at least two
distortions in the present system: "special interests" can bring dis-
proportionate pressure on the Treasury and Congress; and judicial
review only of assessments produces an anti-progressive asymmetry.
Private lawsuits can counter each of these structural flaws. 68
a. Undoing Special Interest Underenforcement
Although current law achieves a surprisingly high degree of neu-
trality, it would be foolish to insist that the income tax does not con-
tain many choices in favor of particular interests at the expense of
the general welfare. Controversy exists only about the extent of
such choices and their inevitability. Violations of neutrality-what I
loosely will call special-interest rules-embody many evils: they dis-
tort economic decisions, redistribute political power, and, in some
cases, offend fundamental notions of fairness.
Absent some constitutional infirmity, decisions that Congress has
written into positive law cannot be undone by private suits. Private
enforcement suits, however, could reverse less visible, and therefore
perhaps more pernicious, attempts to serve special interests
67. Compare Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1, 62-67 (1984), with Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob
Jones University v. United States, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 12-17.
68. See passim sources cited in note 2 supra.
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through underenforcement of their tax obligations. Enforcement
standing produces benefits, then, to the extent it can overturn those
bad rules that Congress will tolerate only tacitly. Conversely, it ac-
complishes nothing in those cases where those interests have suffi-
cient influence to get the rules they want from Congress.
69
The problem is that only a fraction of private enforcement suits
would produce this benefit, but almost all will create the kinds of
costs discussed in the previous section. Because of the system's
neutrality, many if not most income tax rules have no regulatory
purpose, and their intricacy makes the identification of those that do
extremely difficult. Similarly, not all IRS decisions to collect less
taxes than a literal reading of the Code might support disserve soci-
ety in favor of discrete groups. Some reflect fair readings of con-
gressional intent, and others result from a sensible assessment of
the comparative costs and benefits of enforcement. Challenges to
these decisions presumably would fail on their merits, but during
the course of litigation substantial taxpayer uncertainty would be
generated. Moreover, if the suits did succeed and courts substituted
their own readings of the Code, there would be considerable danger
that the courts' decisional rules would be more indefinite or at odds
with related norms than those which were replaced.
For example, nothing in the Internal Revenue Code explicitly ex-
cludes the economic value of leisure from the tax base, which ac-
cording to Section 61 comprises "all income from whatever source
derived." 70 The failure of the government to tax this benefit might
count as underenforcement, but characterizing this decision as sub
rosa service to special interests-here a hypothetical alliance of the
leisure class and the unemployed-seems absurd. Lest the example
seem unrealistic, consider the imbroglio over the taxation of fringe
benefits, which involves many of the same substantive issues of base
definition. Although Congress for some years frustrated the Treas-
ury's efforts to formulate criteria for distinguishing taxable from ex-
cluded benefits, at no time did it explicitly forbid the inclusion of
employee discounts, "no incremental cost" perquisites such as free
air travel, and similar items. Indeed, the Court at one point hinted
69. One episode where Congress ratified a Treasury decision that private litigants
had challenged as a special-interest giveaway involved the asset depreciation system
used to calculate depreciation deductions. After the Treasury promulgated the system
by regulation, a variety of anti-business groups filed suit to enjoin it. Congress then
enacted I.R.C. § 167(m) to provide an explicit statutory basis for the new method. See
Common Cause v. Connally, No. 71-1337 (D.D.C. filed Jun. 17, 1971; dismissed on
motion of plaintiffs Jan. 13, 1972); Bittker, Treasury Authority to Issue the Proposed "Asset
Depreciation Range System" Regulations, 49 TAXEs 265 (1971); Tannenbaum, supra note 2,
at 375.




that the Service was flouting the clear meaning of the Code through
its exclusion of one such benefit, namely supper money reimburse-
ments given to employees who worked late. 7' One even might have
argued that organized labor and large employers had brought polit-
ical pressure on the Treasury to produce this leniency, although
classifying so many taxpayers as a discrete special interest seems
improbable.
If courts had allowed private enforcement during this period, pre-
sumably these issues, as well as questions about the taxability of
water coolers, attractively furnished offices, and other enhance-
ments of the quality of work life, could have come before the courts.
Given the indefiniteness and inconsistency that may arise from
court-made rules, it seems unlikely that litigation would have pro-
duced predictable and reliable guidelines for employers and em-
ployees. Instead, the political process percolated without the
benefit ofjudicial intervention, and after considerable study and de-
bate Congress enacted a comprehensive set of tests for determining
the taxability of these items.72 Although some might argue that
Congress sold out to the unions when it chose these rules, the exclu-
sions in the new law more likely suggest a defensible decision to
avoid taxation where the costs of enforcement (principally indeter-
minate valuation and taxpayer uncertainty about liability) over-
whelm the benefits of inclusion.
While not all Service underenforcement reflects undesirable influ-
ences, not all suits that challenge underenforcement would stem
from disinterested efforts to improve the common weal. 73 To be
sure, a central premise of relaxed standing rules in other areas of
law is the harnessing of private interests to oppose undesirable gov-
ernment choices.74 But, as discussed above, much in the income tax
follows a pattern of offsetting privileges. This pattern extends be-
yond the positive rules contained in the Code to include administra-
tive interpretation as well. Some actions of the Service concededly
do not achieve such evenhandedness, but without sophisticated data
about incidence as well as a global view of tax structure courts will
have a hard time distinguishing Service interpretations catering to
71. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 92-93 at n.28 (1977).
72. I.R.C. § 132 (1984), added by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 877-81.
73. In addition to vindicating client interests, these suits also benefit the lawyers who
bring them. Victories bring prestige, which translates into more business and, for public
interest litigators, more contributions. Successful litigants in tax cases also can recover
attorneys' fees up to a maximum of $ 25,000. See I.R.C. § 7430 (1984). Pro bono liti-
gators can recover fees at the same rate as for-profit law firms. See Blum v. Stenson, 104
S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
74. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
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private interests from those designed to generate public revenues at
an optimal cost.
75
In those cases where the Service exploits the Code's intricacy to
give offsetting concessions to competing groups, the present barri-
ers to private enforcement solve a kind of Prisoner's Dilemma. The
competing groups are better off not investing in expensive suits that
would only cancel out each other's benefits, but given the multiplic-
ity of potential plaintiffs within each group (a product of the perva-
siveness of income taxation), they could not make mutual amnesty
agreements. For such taxpayers, the rule against private enforce-
ment standing gives them the result they would have achieved if
they could have bargained directly with their competitors.
Consider the two cases discussed in the previous section. One
can conceive of the Tax Analysts litigation as an economic battle be-
tween domestic and overseas oil producers, in which the former
claimed that a liberal interpretation of the foreign tax credit gave an
unfair advantage to the latter. As a class, however, owners of do-
mestic oil wells have little to complain about with respect to either
the positive rules governing the taxation of their gains or the Ser-
vice's interpretation of them. To cite only one example, a long-
standing if much disparaged Revenue Ruling that Congress did not
embrace until the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 incorporated it into
the Code allowed limited partners in oil drilling ventures to take an
immediate deduction for prepaid intangible drilling expenses.76
Before the recent amendment, the Code appeared to give the gov-
ernment the power to postpone such deductions at least until the
drilling commenced. In theory, unwarranted acceleration of deduc-
tions benefited all producers, but it had special appeal for tax shel-
ter investors, who for the most part support domestic drilling.
7 7 If
the standing question had come out differently in Tax Analysts, the
overseas oil producers undoubtedly would have sought to strip away
this advantage from their domestic competitors. After the dust had
settled, the relative tax burdens of the two industries might have
ended up unchanged.
75. When the service discriminates directly among competitors by applying different
interpretations of the same provisions, the losers can assert their rights in a refund suit.
See IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. CI. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028
(1966). Private suits to compel increased taxes are necessary only for those cases where
the Service discriminates in the enforcement of functionally equivalent, but formally dif-
ferent provisions.
76. See Rev. Rul. 71-252, 1971-1 C.B. 146, 147, amended by Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), 98 Stat. 494, 601 (adding I.R.C. § 461(i)(2)(D));
Asimow, supra note 2, at 484 & n.7.
77. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1259 (1984); Dillingham v.




As for cases involving ideological rather than economic claims
(and disregarding constitutional claims), one should consider the
role of public interest law firms in such litigation. While these firms
play an important and commendable part in the protection of inter-
ests our society too easily neglects, they also derive more mundane
rewards in the form of fees and prestige (which in turn can be con-
verted into additional contributions and more business). Most of
these firms enjoy the charitable exemption, one of the friendliest
treatments known to the income tax. The Service did not formally
recognize the charitable status of public interest firms until rela-
tively recently, and Congress still has not expressly addressed the
question of their exemption. Reasonable people can disagree over
both technical and policy grounds for this interpretation of the
Code.78 If underenforcement means any debatable Service inter-
pretation that favors taxpayers, then public interest law firms benefit
greatly from exactly such underenforcement. One can speculate
that if the courts were to relax the requirements for enforcement
standing, we soon would see counterclaims in many of the ideologi-
cal suits attacking the tax status of the lawyers whose participation
makes the litigation possible.
These examples may be exceptional rather than normal.
Although no one to date has documented such a charge, the admin-
istrative process might produce substantially different winners and
losers than those whose interests are vindicated and vanquished by
Congress. The key question remains whether courts can success-
fully separate wasteful from beneficial enforcement suits, or rather
would encourage a round of costly but ultimately valueless contests
by competing interest groups.
Courts presumably work at a greater distance from the influences
that create a "special interest" perspective. It may be that, in spite
of the intricacies of the federal income tax, they will do a sufficiently
good job of distinguishing desirable suits to discourage private en-
forcers from bringing all but meritorious claims. Moreover, I may
be too complacent about the susceptibility of the Service to manipu-
lation by private interests. In addition, the institutional laziness of
Congress may lead to many instances of administrative under-
enforcement that cannot be corrected by the legislature, but which
would not be endorsed by legislation if attacked by the courts. I am
confident, however, that the claimed benefits of private enforce-
78. See generally Houck, supra note 2, at 1438-54. Oliver Houck's investigation into
the use of public interest law firms by business interests documents both the ideological
diversity of the firms claiming the charitable exemption and the difficulty of line-drawing
in this area.
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ment-undoing such special interest underenforcement as does ex-
ist in circumstances where Congress will not reverse the courts-are
smaller than first may appear, and will come about in only a fraction
of the private enforcement suits actually brought. The costs of pri-
vate enforcement, however, will arise in almost every suit, and could
be enormous.
b. Combatting Anti-Progressive Taxpayer Litigation
The other benefit claimed for private enforcement is correction of
the fundamental protaxpayer bias and antiprogressive asymmetry of
the present system of judicial review. When the government seeks
to tax, a court can intervene; when the government withholds taxa-
tion, the judiciary has no say. Although no data exists on the ques-
tion, it seems plausible that this bias disproportionately advantages
persons with greater tax liability. The greater the amount of taxes
an individual has at stake, the more likely it is he or she will seek
judicial review of an assessment. High-bracket taxpayers with large
potential liabilities, then, will invest the most in litigation to reduce
their taxes, but there exists no mechanism by which private persons
can invest in offsetting litigation to increase the taxes of the rich.
Because of this imbalance in judicial pressure brought to bear on
the IRS, the absence of private enforcement may systematically un-
dercut the progressivity of taxation.
Although the diagnosis may be valid, the prescription of private
enforcement does not necessarily follow. The question remains
what branch of government has the comparative advantage to cor-
rect the anti-progressive bias of the current system. Nothing pre-
vents the Service from budgeting its enforcement resources to
enhance progressivity. Some crude data suggests that its audit strat-
egies, for example, have increasingly focused on persons with
greater tax burdens. 79 Especially during periods of large deficits,
Congress also is not unresponsive to citizens' complaints about in-
sufficient ambition on the part of the IRS and can act to correct this
problem. Court review of underenforcement probably would not
promote progressivity more than the combined efforts of the Ser-
vice and Congress.80
79. According to figures cited by a former Commissioner, the average amount of
additional tax recommended per return examined has increased from $543 in 1962 to
$6882 in 1982. See Caplin, The Internal Revenue Service's "Hart Wright Method," 82 MICH.
L. REV. 395, 395 n.l (1983).
80. A parallel exists in criminal law, where courts have no power to review the deci-
sion not to initiate proceedings. For an argument that prosecutors generally are the
optimal decisionmakers with respect to the question whether to bring charges, see Eas-




In sum, allowing private enforcement of the income tax through
relaxed standing rules promises uncertain benefits and risks signifi-
cant costs. In light of this cost-benefit calculation, the hostility of
courts to these suits is surely merited. Private enforcement of the
income tax looks too much like an expensive and wasteful
extravagance. 8 1
III. The Future of South Carolina, Allen, and Nontaxpayer Standing
I have tried to identify the costs and benefits of bothjus tertii and
enforcement standing. What emerges is a sense that nontaxpayer
standing can produce harmful confusion and unnecessary litigation
expenses, and that finding the instances where its benefits outweigh
these costs is extremely difficult. In this last section I will survey the
contribution the Court's recent pronouncements might make to the
future development of the law of nontaxpayer standing.
Because it breaks with precedent and appears to assume a permis-
sive stance toward nontaxpayer standing, South Carolina is a striking
decision. It has no obvious limits, as the Court seemed not to rest
its decision on any of the distinctive aspects of the case-the pecu-
liarities of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the nature of
the constitutional claim asserted, or the fact that the plaintiff raised
constitutional rather than statutory issues.8 2 On its face, the deci-
sion seems to authorize Jus tertii standing to attack any federal tax
assessment that will produce economic burdens for someone other
than the nominal taxpayer, as long as the burden-bearer has no di-
rect liability it may challenge.
8 3
81. I recognize, of course, that other moral and political arguments also matter. I
will not rehearse here the many ways that private enforcement suits can both fulfill and
frustrate values and theories that do not depend on utilitarianism and its balancing of
goods and bads. Because my purpose has been to show how a cost-benefit analysis
points toward restricting standing for nontaxpayers, I only will declare my colors with
respect to these additional concerns and then withdraw.
For me, distributional issues underlying the allocation of the tax burden raise hard
questions. Asking courts to override the judgment of the government, and implicitly of
Congress, on these matters implies a willingness to trust unelectedjudges over elected
officials. I realize that in the present era of the bureaucratic state, many people doubt
whether the concept of democratic accountability has any continuing validity. For them,
my worries will have no force. Still, I find extremely disturbing the prospect of tax exac-
tions taking place at the initiative of a self-appointed private prosecutor and with the
approval of a federal judge, but without the support of any person responsible to the
electorate for his decisions.
82. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
83. To date the lower courts have used South Carolina sparingly, but they have not
totally ignored the opportunities it presents. In Food Service and Lodging Institute,
Inc. v. Regan, 583 F. Supp. 1018 (D.D.C. 1984), the court relied on South Carolina's no-
alternative-means-of-review exception in holding that the Anti-Injunction Act did not
bar a restaurant employer's suit that attacked reporting and withholding requirements
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One way of limiting South Carolina might be to tie it as closely to
statutory moorings as possible. Congress already has authorized ju-
dicial review of administrative preclearance affecting municipal
bonds. South Carolina's claim did not fit neatly within the legisla-
tive mandate because the dispute involved a reading of the Consti-
tution rather than of the Internal Revenue Code, but in all material
respects it was the kind of case for which Congress had approved
court review. In the parallel situation ofjudicial review of charitable
exemption decisions, the Court has permitted litigants to raise con-
stitutional claims as well as statutory ones.84 Perhaps the future of
South Carolina will lie in its assimilation into this pattern of congres-
sionally authorized preclearance. 8
5
Any broader reading of the decision will force courts to risk litiga-
tion that causes more harm than good. Although other areas doubt-
lessly exist where judicial preclearance would have net benefits,
identification of those cases seems especially difficult for a court that
must act within the confines of the adversary process. Every private
party that seeksjus tertii standing will claim that his case has the spe-
cial characteristics that justify an extension of South Carolina, while
the Service will be reluctant to take a position that sanctions some,
but not all, exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. Courts will not
know how to choose the worthy cases, and will end up either creat-
affecting its employees. The decision may not portend much, both because it involves
burdens other than the payment of a tax and because the court in question had reached
the same result before South Carolina. Other cases have elided the Anti-Injunction Act
issue by characterizing lawsuits against the Treasury as neither tax suits nor claims for a
refund. See Nelson v. Regan, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984) (due process challenge to
refund intercept program); Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc.
v. Director, FBI, 84-1 USTC (CCH) 9468 (D.D.C. 1984) (first amendment challenge
alleging harassment from, inter alia, being listed as nonexempt ideological organization);
Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984) (due process challenge to refund
intercept program).
84. See Bob Jones University II, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Regan v. Taxation With Rep-
resentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). These cases are slightly different in
that Section 7428, the statute that authorizes declaratory judgments concerning charita-
ble status, applies to federal district courts as well as the U.S. Claims Court and the Tax
Court. Section 7478, which covers municipal bonds, permits only the Tax Court to give
preclearance review. One may argue that an Article I court such as the Tax Court does
not have as much authority to address constitutional questions. That it has no such
authority, however, is clearly wrong.
85. Of course, the Court would have to swallow its pronouncement in South Carolina
that the present declaratory judgment scheme for municipal bond issuers does not per-
mit contests over the constitutionality of Section 103's provisions. See 104 S. Ct. at 1114
n.17. This statement, which simply parroted the government's contention, does not
seem the kind of well-considered holding the repudiation of which would embarrass the
Court. Although extending Section 7478 to include constitutional claims might stretch
its language a bit, this construction does less violence to the reading of the statute than
South Carolina did to the Anti-Injunction Act.
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ing exceptions at random or permittingjus tertii standing whenever a
litigant plausibly can show he bears some incidence of a federal tax
imposed on someone else.
However improvident South Carolina may seem if taken at face
value, the decision may prove beneficial if it provokes Congress into
rethinking the current declaratory judgment structure and tying it
more explicitly to the Anti-Injunction Act. Congress probably
should broaden the class of cases eligible for pretransaction declara-
tory judgments, but this will require decisions about what level of
resources the Service should dedicate to litigation and to the identi-
fication of those disputes where preclearance promises clear bene-
fits. In areas such as corporate reorganizations, for example,
preclearance of some sort is essential, but the refusal of the Service
to approve one form of a transaction usually does not close other
paths for attaining the same substantive result. In these cases anti-
taxpayer results are not as devastating, and judicial review might not
justify its costs. In addition, Congress should put to rest the uncer-
tainty generated by the implications of South Carolina. In the course
of choosing where else to sanction court review of preclearance,
Congress should bolster the Anti-Injunction Act to make clear that
these authorized instances of pretransactional judicial review are
meant to be exclusive.
As for Allen, its potential for future development is more latent,
but also more significant, than South Carolina's. At present the rule
against nontaxpayer enforcement rests on tenuous assumptions
about the behavioral impact of nontaxation. One need look only at
the Court's recent commerce clause and interstate commerce deci-
sions to understand that it clearly does believe that nontaxation can
materially harm identifiable groups of persons. 86
It seems inevitable that some litigant eventually will surmount the
causation obstacles erected by Eastern Kentucky and Allen. The Court
will then face the task of answering candidly the question that it may
already have decided implicitly: Has Congress in the course of cre-
ating the various duties and privileges found in the Internal Reve-
nue Code done anything that private enforcement through the
courts would improve?
Because no explicit congressional authorization exists, the ques-
tion becomes whether courts should imply a private enforcement
structure in the absence of clear congressional signals to the con-
86. E.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049 (1984). See generally
Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983).
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trary, and if so what kind. The basic difficulty is the same as withjus
tertii standing: In the absence of legislative guidance, how can
courts construct a system that reaches less than all possible dis-
putes? Given the incentives to bring enforcement suits and the in-
complete internalization of their costs, there is no reason to trust
private prosecutors to select only worthwhile questions for judicial
review, and widespread reopening of settled rules can wreak havoc
on federal taxation. Yet in the absence of some settled understand-
ing within the judiciary about the kinds of rights that most need vin-
dication, either because of their significance or because of doubts
about administrative enthusiasm for them, the existence of any pri-
vate enforcement option tends to throw open almost any issue to
litigation.
Again there is no way out of the dilemma until Congress acts, but
unlike the case ofjus tertii standing, few advantages from any con-
gressional action are apparent here. If special interests can hold the
Treasury captive, one wonders how Congress can overcome their
opposition. If anything, the common wisdom has Congress in
greater thrall to these groups than is the Treasury. Moreover, the
assignment to the judiciary of the authority to exact taxes raises im-
portant issues about democratic accountability and political struc-
ture. On balance, the wiser course is to keep the courts closed to
private enforcement actions.
A possible solution, perhaps no more than a fig leaf, would be the
creation of an inspector general entity responsible for reviewing
Treasury enforcement practice. This body could challenge IRS in-
terpretations of the Code as well as investigate accusations of insuf-
ficient prosecutorial ambition. Rotation of personnel might prevent
too many self-justifying charges by this entity, and a tradition of
staggered, bipartisan appointments might deter too-rapid politiciza-
tion. Moral authority and publicity would be its only tools, but per-
haps these would do the most good while causing the least harm.
On the other hand, what criticism and moral guidance we need
with respect to federal tax underenforcement may already be avail-
able from sources outside of government. Legal scholars often pre-
fer addressing their complaints to the courts, in part because their
distinctive skills generally are more congenial to judicial than polit-
ical advocacy. But the community of tax specialists bears a special
duty to chastise and harass the Service, Treasury, Congress, and the
public. The real lesson of Allen may be that those who write about




have an obligation to generate the intellectual tools that will enable
the government to interpret and enforce the Internal Revenue Code
in a manner that satisfies the basic needs of our society. In the long
run, intelligent criticism may do more than any new executive
agency to promote the fair and efficient administration of the fed-
eral income tax.
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